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  The influential Scherer and Ross text (1990, p. 411) states that the “main question” in empirical industrial 
organization in the latter part of the twentieth century is Bain’s (1951) “collusion” or “agreement” hypothesis versus 
Demsetz’s (1973) “superior firm” hypothesis.  Prior to the Federal Trade Commission Line-of-Business (LOB) studies the 
“contending schools were deadlocked,” but these studies led to a win being declared for the superiority hypothesis by 
Scherer writing with seven other LOB researchers (1987).  These studies found that the effect of concentration on profits 
disappeared when controlling for firm shares.  As many economists agreed, merger policy shifted away from a focus on 
agreement to applying a “unilateral effects” (non-cooperative Nash) approach. 
  We develop a nine year panel LOB data set for Korea.  We perform three types of tests, all of which support both 
hypotheses, but which show that the agreement effect overwhelmingly dominates the superiority effect in pricing.  First 
we examine a secondary implication of the superiority model: profit aggregation should imply that if share is negatively 
related to firm profits, so should concentration be negatively related to industry profits.  Instead, we find that for those 
industries with a negative share relationship, the concentration profits relationship is positive and virtually identical to the 
relationship for the full sample in both within and between panel tests. 
  Next we introduce a commonly cited model in the empirical literature.  This model is cited to motivate the 
proposition that both share and concentration should have an effect on firm profits.  However, authors who cite this model 
then typically use an ad hoc specification rather than estimating this as a structural model.  We develop our structural 
model and define latent variables to distinguish between domestic and export price cost margins (PCMs) and to identify 
firm “conjectures” as they impact the domestic PCM.  Demand elasticities are captured in non-linear industry fixed 
effects.  We show that concentration plays an overwhelming role in determining firm PCMs, with firm share playing a far 
smaller role.  We additionally exploit the structural characteristics of the model to deal with the possibility that deviations 
between marginal costs and average costs might be driving the results. 
  For supporting evidence we construct a new latent variable identifying the domestic/export price ratio.  We find a 
strong “within” relationship between concentration and the domestic/export price ratio, again firm shares play a weaker 
role. 
  Finally, we discuss why our results differ from the FTC-LOB studies and provide evidence that would suggest that 
the FTC studies’ conclusions are biased due to the 1973 removal of price controls and energy crisis, the “stagflation” of 
the 1970s, and the use of national firm shares along with geographically weighted averages of concentration ratios.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 411) state that the “main question” in empirical industrial organization in 
the latter part of the twentieth century is Bain’s (e.g., 1951) “collusion” or “agreement” hypothesis versus 
Demsetz’s (1973) “superior firm” hypothesis.
1  Bain showed a correlation between industry concentration 
(the share of industry shipments by the largest 8 firms) and industry profits and attributed this to some 
form of agreement or collusion between firms.  Harold Demsetz in 1973 pointed out that if an industry 
has some superior firms, these firms will increase their shares and their profits, hence industry 
concentration will rise and industry profits will rise.  The Demsetz argument then is that the aggregation 
of firm shares and profits to the industry level will lead to a concentration-profit rate correlation due not 
to collusion, but to dynamic competition.  To address the extent to which each of these non-mutually 
exclusive views has validity and how much each one affects industry outcomes, one needs data not only 
on industry concentration and profits, but also on firm shares and profits: Line-of-Business (LOB) data.  
For the United States, such data were collected by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for a few years 
in the mid 1970s. 
  “The contending schools were deadlocked,” declared Scherer et al. (1987) writing collectively with 
seven other LOB authors (Long, Martin, Mueller, Pascoe, Ravenscraft, Scott, and Weiss).  But, they 
continued, the LOB data broke the deadlock.
2  The LOB data integrated firm shares and concentration in 
explaining firm level price-cost margins ((P-AC)/P hereinafter PCM).  (The implicit assumption is that 
AC and MC are similar, so this will capture the price-marginal cost margin.)  These found that share 
(superiority), not concentration (agreement), explained PCMs.  The superiority hypothesis was declared 
the winner!
3 
  Following this, the influential Scherer text (1980 p. 294-95; with Ross in 1990 p. 446) changed its 
tune to “power appears to be wielded not collectively . . .” (emphasis added to the new 1990 wording).  
The consequent revolution in thought had profound influences on public policy.  Antitrust merger 
analysis in the 1992 DOJ-FTC “Merger Guidelines” switched from: 
 
the major emphasis . . . [being] merger-induced ‘coordination effects’, or 
‘implicit collusion’ . . . [to] a focus on ‘unilateral effects’ . . . [T]his unilateral 




“Unilateral Effects” are essentially the question of whether a merger induced change in industry structure 
raises prices in a non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium (conditional upon any efficiency gains likely to also 
be induced by the merger). 
                                                           
1 It is worth noting Brozen’s (1971) “Disequilibrium hypothesis.”  He showed mean reversion: high concentration 
industries with high profits tended to have profits decline over time.  Jeong and Masson (2003) argue that mean 
reversion is natural in a simultaneous equations profit and structure market power model which they estimate using 
Korean data.  Brozen mentions the possibility of superior firms and notes that in Bain’s (mid depression) data, the 
low concentration industries were more likely to have the leading firm’s profits lower than industry profits, 
suggesting that where small firms are superior, concentration would be lower.  In our data set, however, the 
industries with negative share profit relationships have somewhat greater concentration than the other industries and 
the frequency is the same across categories. 
2 Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 429) attribute the “Definitive evidence” to Ravenscraft (1983), and go on to say that the 
earlier results “... appear to be spurious, a construct of aggregating...” shares to concentration (p. 430). 
3 It is noteworthy that since then Machin and Van Reenen (1993) published a line of business study for the UK (e.g., 
they used firm data with judgement about whether each firm is really mostly in one line of business) in which they 
find strong concentration effects after adjusting for share effects.  This paper, however, has done little to turn the 
tide. 
4 White does continue, “The pendulum now seems to be swinging back, with a rekindled interest in coordinated 
effects.”  Papers following his special volume introduction make this point as well. Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 81  2
  Still, despite the revolution in thought about agreement in the 1980s and 90s, Scherer’s texts (1980 p. 
295; 1990 with Ross p. 447) discussing “agreement” versus “superiority” conclude with almost identical 
wording: 
The research agenda for the future must stress obtaining data of high quality 
and assaulting them imaginatively with high-powered econometric tools to 
discriminate among the still-contending behavioral hypotheses (1990). 
 
  It is our contention that the conclusions from the FTC-LOB studies are seriously flawed, in part 
because the data were collected for only a few highly atypical (energy crisis, stagflation) years.  We will 
provide evidence for this after our main results are presented.  We also note that virtually all previous 
work uses econometric tools which are not up to the task of addressing the issues raised by the authors in 
this literature.  This is in part because these studies have used a model to “justify” ad hoc specifications, 
whereas we estimate the structure implied by the model.
5  To estimate the structural model, as we do, 
requires more sophisticated econometric tools, such as sparse matrix inversion algorithms, which may be 
part of the reason why the earlier literature is mostly using the model for motivation but not for actual 
structural estimation. 
  We have constructed a new LOB data set for Korea: a panel from 1987 through 1995.  We analyze 
the superiority and “agreement” hypotheses using both reduced form and structural modeling.  Our 
structural model derives firm price cost margins as a function of industry concentration, industry demand 
elasticity, and firm share.  We find that most of the industry cross section PCM effect, at least in Korea, is 
explained by the “agreement” hypothesis.  The “superiority” effect is present as well, but it plays little 
role in biasing the “agreement” results. 
  Our results start with reduced form results demonstrating that aggregation bias is not explaining the 
Korean data.  We show that industries which have negative share-PCM relationships have concentration-
PCM relationships very close to those for the entire sample, whereas the Demsetz aggregation argument 
would predict the opposite sign for such industries.  That is, only the “agreement” hypothesis explains 
this sign result.  We then use panel data techniques to show that the signs and significance of the cross-
section reduced forms results are robust to inter-industry excluded variables (such as demand elasticity, 
accounting rules, scale economies and capacity utilization, four factors which have been mentioned by 
others as potentially leading to biases
6).  It should be noted, however, that we show there is also evidence 
supporting the “superiority” hypothesis. 
  Next we present a structural model.  This model has been derived by several FTC-LOB authors 
(Kwoka and Ravenscraft (1986), Rosenbaum and Manns (1994)) and others (Machin and Van Reenen 
(1993)), but they have not proceeded with structural estimation (they use the model and then add “control 
variables”).  The model is also derived by Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984) (hereinafter CDW), who 
employ a novel structural approach, but one which is not as efficient as the Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) approach we employ.
7  It also cannot be used to model unobservables in the error term, as we do 
herein. 
  Our structural model has, of course, the same simplifying assumptions used by others, including (at 
least initially) homogeneous products.  However, we can derive other implications of the model because it 
is structural.  One key ingredient is that we can distinguish between domestic and export PCMs and also 
between the different competitive conditions domestically and in exports.  Furthermore, the model can be 
modified to check for sensitivity to alternative assumptions.  For example, we explore a structural model 
                                                           
5 As we shall note later, the only way one could meaningfully estimate the structural model using U.S. data is with 
the subset of truly national industries. 
6 Cf. Fisher and McGowen 1983; Benston 1987 (Scherer et al. reply); and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986); not to 
mention reviewers of this paper.  Note, in the U.S., if depreciation rates are inaccurate and capital intensity is related 
to concentration, then accounting data could lead to biased results.  In Korea, where firms were doubling in size in 
matters of only a few years, biases due to depreciation formulae are less likely to bias results. 
7 In the computing environment of the early 1980s, using our techniques would have been a major undertaking and 
the techniques were not well known or entirely derived as of that time. Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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in which MC≠AC (leading to a non-zero expected value of the error term) and explore different 
assumptions on product differentiation as well as examining sub samples of homogeneous industries. 
  After presenting the core structural model relating firm PCMs to concentration and firm shares, 
under the assumption of industry specific demand elasticities, we move on to a supporting test.  We 
derive a variable which is equal to a firm’s domestic price divided by its export price.  From this we can 
allow for a highly flexible form of the agreement hypothesis (agreement is an industry specific parameter) 
and ask if concentration affects this price ratio after controlling for the superiority/share effects, which it 
does. 
  From all of our tests we find that there is strong support for the “superiority” hypothesis but that its 
magnitude is such that the “agreement” hypothesis dominates the results. 
  Since our results are revisionist relative to the FTC-LOB results, we finally address possible reasons 
for the sharp contrast between our Korean LOB results and the FTC-LOB results. 
 
2. “Agreement” versus “Superiority” Q Concentration versus Share? 
  
Before turning to the literature we address why we use quotation marks around “agreement” instead 
of employing the more commonly used term “collusive.”  By “agreement” we do not mean to restrict 
ourselves to concepts like price-fixing or trigger strategy equilibria.  Mutual forbearance can spring from 
behavioral explanations or enlightened self interest.  By “agreement” we simply mean some relationship 
which suggests that when leading firms jointly have larger shares (i.e., the industry exhibits  high 
concentration, or a high “CR”) they are less aggressive price competitors.
8  In fact, this hypothesis has 
many names in the literature.  It is variously called the “market power,” the “collusive,” or the “Structure-
Conduct-Performance”  hypothesis.  Demsetz’s “superior efficiency hypothesis” is sometimes called the 
“efficiency hypothesis.”  We prefer to refer to it as the “superiority hypothesis” because, as Demsetz and 
others note, it applies to more than technical efficiency, e.g., consumer preferences for what they feel is a 
“superior” product. 
  Following  Demsetz (1973), which used questionable 3-digit industry data,
9 the next series of papers 
on firm shares versus concentration effects used the PIMS data which produced the general result that 
once one controls for market share, the concentration-profit relationship disappears.  But again, the data 
can be questioned.
10  Following these studies, the key papers leading to a decline in the Structure-
Conduct-Performance methodology were those based on the Federal Trade Commission Line-of-Business 
data for 1973-77.  The published studies generally found that once the market shares of individual firms 
were used as some form of control, concentration had no independent effect on firm profits (indeed its 
influence was typically negative).  Scherer, with seven other LOB scholars (1987): 
                                                           
8 The collusion or agreement hypothesis has support in the trigger strategy literature (cf. Tirole 1990).  “Agreement” 
can be a Nash equilibrium in a supergame.  These models depend upon common knowledge.  “Agreement” may 
require “pregame communication” to agree on the relevant parameters: rival’s costs, discount factors, what form of 
behavior may be triggered, and so on.  To effectuate such “tacit collusion” in trigger price games with explicit 
communication would be found to be “explicit collusion” in antitrust cases (see e.g., Hay and Kelley 1974 for the 
“tasks” for agreement). We have a wider concept in mind: “agreement” in a behavioral world need not be 
“collusion” but forbearance from harsher forms of competition. 
9 He tested the share-profitability relationship with three digit data and found a positive relationship.  He used 
weighted averages of four digit concentration levels to find three digit concentration levels.  This approach has 
already been criticized, cf. Vernon 1972 and Telser 1964.   
10 A representative study is Gale and Branch (1982) which finds a negative concentration effect adjusting for share.  
Regarding the data, Scherer and Ross (1990) state, “First, there is an element of self-selection for both the 
cooperating companies and the businesses on which they choose to report, and in some quantifiable respects the 
sample is clearly not representative. Second, the data sets are subjected to stringent confidentiality restrictions so 
that an analyst cannot ascertain what companies and industries are being studied or what the absolute size of any 
given business is.” Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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recognize the impact LB data analyses have had in modifying views on such 
structure-performance relationships . . . The contending schools were 
deadlocked . . . [LOB research] has shown that individual market share effects 
are indeed much more powerful than the traditionally emphasized concentration 
effects in explaining profitability . . . concentration coefficients turn out to be 
negative.  (Emphasis added) 
 
  From this and other influences, there have been changes in U.S. antitrust policies that were formerly 
predicated on the market power theory.  Merger analysis used to be based upon market power 
“agreement” arguments.  But following the FTC-LOB studies, much of the merger policy in the U.S. 
today is based on what is called “unilateral effects” analysis (White 2003).  Rather than examining 
concentration as a matter of concern due to an enhanced propensity for “agreement,” the question brought 
to merger data today is typically whether the change in shares or concentration suggest that the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium is likely to be altered in such a fashion that prices will rise given a merger.
11  
Privatization analyses also generally ignore the “agreement hypothesis.” 




3. The Korean Economy: Relevant Contrasts to the United States 
 
  It is not our intent to provide a detailed analysis of the Korean economy; we merely seek to highlight 
the differences that affect our methodology and may affect one’s interpretation of our tests and results. 
  The Korean economy has had little effective (or actual) antitrust policy so we are able to examine the 
market power-agreement hypothesis in the absence of effective antitrust policies.  Over our sample 
period, 1987-95, the Korean economy had an annual average growth rate of 8.21%.  The U.S. grew at 
2.78% and Japan grew at 3.18% over this period.  This means the Korean economy doubled over this 
period and manufacturing grew even faster.  With this growth comes a greater potential for volatility in 
firm shares and in concentration ratios over time.  A greater variance in the independent variables 
potentially leads to greater explanatory power in panel estimation. 
  Another salient feature of the Korean economy is that it is geographically compact.  There are only 
two major which are located within a half a day’s drive of each other.  This has a significant advantage 
over using U.S. data, as in the FTC-LOB studies.  For example, consider the Borden or Carnation 
companies in fresh fluid milk sales in the U.S. over the last thirty years.
12  Processed fluid milk is 
typically sold within a one day route delivery distance from a plant.  Thus, there are many geographically 
defined competitive zones or markets.  Suppose, as seems likely, Carnation and Borden were “superior 
firms.”  They would then have a large incentive to operate in many geographic markets, and indeed both 
had fluid milk plants in multiple geographic markets.  Taking superiority literally for each market, the 
firms might have somewhat higher local shares leading to somewhat higher local concentration, but these 
firms’ incentives to be in many markets will lead to proportionally larger national shares than one would 
associate with the superiority effect in any given market.  The relevant concentration effects, though, will 
remain the average of local effects, with proportionally much smaller local “share” effects.  Although the 
geographic aggregation problems have been discussed in great detail in the context of market power 
                                                           
11 As shares and concentration rise, is price likely to rise given reasonable estimates of synergies from the merger?  
See, e.g., Baker (1997) and the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 1997, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. 
12 An unknown reviewer claimed that a flaw in our example was that Borden and Carnation produced only 
condensed milk.  In fact, they had dominant national shares in fresh fluid milk consumption which is exactly the 
point.  The fact that a reviewer did not know this fact demonstrates how geographically fragmented the market for 
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studies, their import for the superiority hypothesis, especially in contrast to the agreement hypothesis in 
nested testing, has been largely ignored.
13  The potential bias created by using an average of local 
concentrations but national shares, rather than local shares, is great.
14 
  More strikingly, Borden and Carnation are also excellent examples of “agreement.”  They both have 
been involved in several fluid milk price-fixing cases over the last thirty years, each case covering a 
limited geographic area. 
  Other geographic factors are, however, more problematic.  Korea has significant imports and exports 
leading to adjustments which we discuss in the data section. 
  Another unique aspect of the Korean economy is an industrial structure which enables us to construct 
an LOB data set.  Our data covers 365 firms from 54 industries in nine years giving 2,698 observations 
across firms, years, and industries.  Our data was not collected specifically by LOB’s, but rather by noting 
that in Korea many firms are essentially selling in only one LOB.  In Korea there is a “Chaebol” or 
“Group” structure.  Samsung, during our data period, was not one firm but roughly forty firms.  The 
Samsung firm that produced picture tubes was not the same firm that produced TV’s.  Later there was a 
separate Samsung auto firm as well.  One could own stock in one firm and not another and so the firms 
are stand alone entities except in a few respects such as internal capital market credit allocations, 
cosigning agreements, and, relatedly, strategic planning. 
  The vast majority of Chaebol firms have coverage ratios of over 90% in a single four digit industry 
(Korean Standard Industry Codes (KSICs) and U.S. SIC four digit industry definitions are similar in level 
of differentiation), and those few which do not have high coverage are readily identifiable in our data. 
 
 
4. Methodological Discussion 
 
As noted earlier, several studies have motivated PCM-concentration-share modeling on a 
homogeneous goods oligopoly model but then they have not applied a structural approach to the model.  
CDW (1984) did apply a structural approach but in an econometrically less efficient method than the one 
we use.  They, as others, show the theory of an oligopoly allowing for “consistent conjectures” 
(conjectural variations
15) in a quantity setting model.  They show the theory leads to a structure which can 
be estimated if they carry out four steps: first, regress PCM on shares by industry; second, select the 
subset of industries for which there is a positive market share  -  profit relationship (capturing the 
efficiency effect) and from this derive the non-linear estimate of “conjectures”; third, limit the sample to 
the subset of industries for which this parameter is less competitive than the Cournot conjecture; fourth, 
regress the estimated “conjectures” parameter on market concentration.  CDW apply this methodology to 
U.K. manufacturing data for the mid 1970s and find support for both the market power and the efficiency 
effects hypotheses.
16 
  We pursue a similar model using more powerful techniques.  We then examine sensitivity of our 
results to the homogeneous products specification.  We provide two sets of tests assuming heterogeneous 
products and analyze a sub-sample of definitely homogeneous products industries.  For the simple model, 
firms maximize profits: 




                                                           
13 We demonstrate this more formally using an equilibrium market entry game in footnote . 
14  Note, these arguments have normally been posed as if they applied to a single market.  Recognizing national 
share does not always refer to a single market is important in understanding applications to the United States in 
which researchers have used national shares but used estimated averages of local market concentration levels. 
15  This is a static concept pertaining to a firm’s perception of how its rivals would set their outputs if they correctly 
anticipated the original firm’s output decision; generally one refers to this using more dynamic sounding language, 
e.g., what would my rivals do “in response” to a change in my output? 
16 They find significant concentration effects.  Why does this not offset the conclusions from the FTC-LOB studies?  
There is probably some feeling that the British data are not as well defined as the FTC-LOB data. Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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where the i subscript refers to firm i. 
Defining             as the total quantity of i’s rivals’ output and the conjectural variation as the elasticity  , 









where 0 is the industry demand elasticity. 
 For  Cournot,  " = 0 and for a monopoly " is said to be equal to 1.
17, 18 
 
CDW run share regressions of the form                                        for each industry k, to arrive at 
industry k “conjectural variations” defined as                                        canceling out the industry specific 
demand elasticities.  They take “agreement” as meaning “less competitive than Cournot,” so they exclude 
industries for which   
19 






to test whether the conjectures are a positive function of concentration, finding that they are.
20 
  Our structural tests use the same mathematics but apply more powerful econometric techniques.  Our 
tests are related to the CDW conjectural specification, but construct latent variables in an entirely new 
fashion.  We model the domestic PCM using a non-linear constrained regression, creating a latent variable 





As we demonstrate, this is a more powerful econometric formulation.  The CDW methodology 
weighs each estimated "k equally, regardless of “goodness of fit,” but this should not be the case.  Should 
a positive "1 = 0.30 with a standard deviation of F1 = 0.01 be outweighed by an "2 = -0.35 if it has a F2 = 
                                                           
17 The fact that neither statement can be literally true of an asymmetric cost constant returns to scale industry is 
seldom acknowledged. 
18 If this model is literally true and Cournot is the actual state of affairs, a regression of PCMi on [si + "(1-si)]/0 
would lead to an " = 0.  Industry level CR affects industry PCM when " = 0 because industry PCM is 
2
ii i s PCM = s /h = Herfendahl/h ∑∑ , but, in both CDW and our model, defining "/(0+(1CR must lead to 
(0 = (1 = 0 with firm level PCM data if the world is Cournot. 
19 For symmetric oligopoly: " = 1 Y “monopoly”: " = 0 Y Cournot; and " = -1/(n-1) Y  “competition.” With linear 
conjectures,  / ii X x λ − =∂ ∂ , rather than our elasticity conjectures, 8 = (n-1) “monopoly”; 8 = 0 Y Cournot; and 8 
= -1 Y “competition.”  One can make a case for using " for conjectures greater than 0 and 8 for conjectures less than 
zero, but with only seven industries with " slightly less than zero for some years, we do not pursue this here. 
20 The data do not permit firm level "’s to be based upon considerations such as whether they are the largest firm in 
the industry. 
X&i









η ' [si %α(1&si)]/η ' [α %(1&α)si]/η
PCMik ' β0k % β1ksik
ˆ αk / ˆ β0k ( ˆ β0k % ˆ β1k ),
ˆ αk <0
ˆ αk ' γ0 % γ1 CRk % εk
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1.0 (when "1 is significantly greater than zero, but "2 is not significantly different from "1)?  Obviously 
not.   
The intuition can be explained in the context of OLS.  Suppose the model were of the form 
Yki = "k + $Xki (k is industry, i is firm within industry) and we only cared about the parameter $ which we 
feel is positive and common across industries.  One has the option of first running individual industry 
regressions to obtain an estimated industry parameter 
ˆ βk  for each industry.  Treating each estimated 
value as an estimate of a single common $, then one can test the simple average of the estimated  
ˆ βk ’s to see if it is positive.  What this does is equally weight each observed 
ˆ βk  regardless of its goodness 
of fit in the first stage.  A more efficient estimator of the common $ would be to use GLS at the second 
stage.  The GLS estimator would use inverse variance weighting of the first stage parameters so that more 
precisely estimated 
ˆ βk ’s would receive a greater weight in the second stage regression. 
  If these OLS regressions are combined into a single OLS regression, analogous to what we do here, 
the individual 
ˆ βk ’s would not be estimated, rather one would obtain the common parameter $ directly.  
The estimated $, in effect, would be the inverse variance weighted mean of the 
ˆ βk ’s.  The 
implementation in our case is much more complicated than this example suggests, as we will estimate a 
common latent variable (not a single parameter) across industries and our model is non-linear in its fixed 
effects. 
  Since our model is non-linear in fixed effects we cannot use the standard differences from means 
method of panel fixed effect estimation.  We use dummy variables for the fixed effects, ηk’s.,   Returning 
to our OLS example, suppose there were N industries.  If we used dummies for the fixed effects there 
would be N+2 parameters to estimate.  For an individual industry, its assigned dummy will be a one, and 
the other N-1 industry dummies will have zeros.  With numerous firms, industries, and years, zeroes will 
dominate.  So the X`X matrix is said to be “sparse.”  Two computational problems are discussed in the 
literature.  First, the size of the matrix can exceed the storage capacity of the computer used (not a 
problem in our application, but this would have been for CDW in the early 1980s).  Secondly, zeroes in 
floating point computations are not exact zeroes: using standard computational techniques will exacerbate 
“round-off” errors in the computations, potentially making the computations unreliable (Thisted 1988).  
This is particularly important in nonlinear fixed effect estimation, as we have here. 
  The theoretical structure applies to the domestic market, but the Korean economy has many 
industries with substantial exports.  Although concentration may affect domestic pricing, Korean firms 
are unlikely to have much market power in international markets.  Efficiency effects, however, should be 
important for exports.  This too can be handled by the construction of latent variables.  Consider the 











where                                                             The PCM is defined as total net revenue divided by total 
revenue.  Total revenue is calculated as the domestic price times domestic quantity (p
Dx
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price deflated by the exchange rate times export quantity (p
fEx
x).  Net revenue is calculated as total 
revenue minus domestic and foreign product costs per unit, 
{c
D,c
X}, multiplied by their respective quantities.  Firm PCM is simply a weighted average of the 
domestic and export PCMs (in domestic currency). 
  By applying the same substitutions as above for equations and to obtain the domestic PCM latent 
variable and " we can embed the concentration terms in the domestic PCM, substituting out for the $0 and 
$1 in the CDW model.  For the export PCM, we assume a common conjecture and a common export 
demand elasticity,                     (e.g., if exports were competitive there would be a common demand 








where the latent variable for domestic PCM is the first expression on the right hand side.  The latent 
variable for " is given by                                      and 0k is the domestic demand elasticity, an industry 
fixed effect.  For domestic PCMs we have 54 industry specific parameters (the 0k’s) and two 
“common” parameters {(0,(1}.  For the export PCM, these assumptions lead to two common 
parameters.  There are four common parameters and 54 fixed effects.  The two common parameters 
in the domestic PCM are part of the maintained hypothesis in CDW.  Many other models also posit a 
common function relating CR to profits (and other variables) across industries.  (Allowing for 
industry specific demand elasticities is uncommon in this  literature, with the exception of CDW and 
work following their methodology.
21 ) 
  Before turning to model variants, we discuss implementation.  As noted above, one must use 
dummy variables for our industry fixed effects.  This leads to a sparse matrix problem which we 
handle by extending an approach pioneered by Mundlak (1961).  He noted that the design matrix for 
a linear regression with dummies had a special structure so that one could analytically do the 
partitioned inversion of the XNX matrix to obtain an analytic expression for the common coefficients 
(as well as the individual effects).  Chamberlain (1980) noted that one could use a similar technique 
in a maximum likelihood setting.
22  If one were using Newton-Raphson (or something similar) to 
maximize the (log) likelihood, each iteration of the procedure will have a structure similar to the 
linear case.  One can analytically simplify the Newton-Raphson procedure to update the common 
parameters by inverting a matrix of only size (k×k), where k is the number of common parameters.  
One then updates the estimates of the individual effects one at a time as a function of the update to 
the common parameters.  Iterating this process until it converges maximizes the log likelihood.   
Chamberlain did this in a logit setting.  Jakubson (1988) applies similar calculations to a Tobit model.  
Jakubson (2001) notes that a similar updating technique could be used for nonlinear least squares, which 
is what we introduce here; the details of which are in the Appendix. 
Einstein said “Make your theory as simple as possible, but no simpler.”  Our basic model, as in (6), 
is highly simplified.  We do test more complex models including firm specific demand elasticities, a form 
of symmetric product differentiation and apply the simple model to a subsample of homogeneous goods 
industries.  We also model the error term gikt'µikt%giktN
 where gN has a zero mean and the µ reflects 
factors that could lead to a measurement error due to MC…AC.  As the results from these additional, more 
                                                           
21 See Masson and Shaanan (1984) for another variant of industry specific demand elasticities. 
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complex, specifications deviate only slightly from those in the basic model in (6), we analyze this basic 





Our data come from various sources.  For the firm level panel data we obtained balance sheets, 
income statements, and manufacturing cost statements from the Korean Investors Service, Inc. data base 
(KIS) for 1987 to 1995.  We selected all manufacturing firms listed on the Korean stock market which we 
then matched to their respective industries according to their 4-digit KSICs (Korean Standard Industry 
Codes) in order to measure market share and concentration.  We excluded firms matched to the Census 
“catch all” industries (with names like, etc, misc, nec, and nsk, each denoting non-homogeneous sub 
definitions).  We screened to make certain that firms in our sample had high coverage ratios in individual 
Census industries; only a couple firms needed to be dropped by this criterion.  Finally we required at least 
two firms with full information to include an industry/year in the sample; the remaining sample includes 
363 firms in 54 industries.
23 
    The KIS data contain a firm’s domestic and export sales.  A firm’s sales are divided into 
manufacturing sales and merchandise sales; we analyze only manufacturing sales and manufacturing 
costs.  KSIC industry sales are obtained from the “Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey” from the 
National Statistical Office.  We merge industry export and import data with the Input-Output Table from 
the Bank of Korea, adjusting for minor differences in industry code definitions between the KSIC and the 
I-O classifications. 




Our dependent variable is the price-cost margin.
24  The theoretical definition is  
PCM / (P - MC)/P.  Since marginal cost is not observable, given U.S. data availability, most researchers 
have used short-run average variable costs in place of MC.
25  In cost minimization, where     
  MC = AC > AVC, it is common to control for the industry capital output ratio (K/O) on the right 
side and interpret the coefficient on K/O as the opportunity cost of capital – as if it had been deducted 
from the left side and hence the remainder of the right side is interpreted as explaining the price to 
marginal cost ratio.  We instead calculate (P - AC) / P, with estimates of capital costs deducted from the 
dependent variable (our results are robust to using AVC and including K/O as a regressor).  In non-
strategic equilibria (ignoring excess capacity strategies), once a firm is past its mes (minimum efficient 
scale) it should attempt to minimize costs where SRMC = SRAC = LRMC = LRAC.  Most detailed cost 
studies imply that when there is an AC elevation below mes, it is typically moderate (cf. Scherer and Ross 
1990).  Hence, AC should, in equilibrium, be close to MC (e.g., with substantial price cost margins, only 
a small fraction may be explained by an AC - MC differences).  This argument is a priori.  However, 
                                                           
23 206 firms have data for all 9 nine years, the mean number of years is 7.4. 
24 As noted elsewhere (e.g., Jeong and Masson (2003), Schmalensee (1985)) for an entry study one would wish to 
use some form of return on investment.  Our use of PCM is justified by the use of the conjectural model which 
assumes firms interact only with existing rivals.  In Jeong and Masson (1990) the argument is presented that in high 
growth industries (e.g., most of Korean manufacturing) limit pricing should not be observed, and they present results 
consistent with this interpretation.  (If entry considerations affect current pricing in this model, it would be captured 
in the industry fixed effect like a “long run demand elasticity” effect). 
25 If a firm is at or above its minimum efficient scale (mes), where long run costs reach their minimum, any cost 
minimizing equilibrium will have MC = AC.  Given cost function studies, MC should generally be very close to AC 
for cost minimizing firms, even firms which are smaller than mes. Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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because our model is a structural model, we can test for biases due to differences between AC and MC in 
a fashion which will be demonstrated after the results from the first structural model are presented. 
  LOB data have an advantage over many other data sets in that we have firm specific measures of 
K/O, Ki/Oi.  Many earlier studies have been constrained to industry averages.  The definition we want is 
the opportunity cost of capital, r(Ki/Oi), where we need a measure of the cost of capital.  For the 
opportunity cost of capital, we use each year’s financial expense as a proportion of  total borrowing in the 
manufacturing sector (11.2% to 13.6% over our sample period) published in the Financial Statement 
Analysis by the Bank of Korea.
26  For capital we use tangible fixed assets.
27  The “Cost of Goods 
Manufactured” in the KIS data includes raw material costs, labor costs, electricity, utilities, taxes, and the 
like.  PCM is defined as sales net of the cost of goods manufactured and capital costs divided by sales. 
 
 
5.2. Market Shares Concentration 
The numerator for the share data comes from KIS.  Industry shipments data come from the National 
Statistical Office (NSO).  An almost unique element in our panel is CR being measured as the annual 
three firm concentration ratio calculated from raw Census data provided by the NSO.  Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1986a, 1986b), for example, had to extrapolate between Census years.  They 
noted stable concentration trends justify extrapolation.  In Korea, with high manufacturing growth rates, 
there is a sufficient enough amount of volatility that having annual data provides power for our tests (e.g., 
for establishing “within” results).  Machin and Van Reenen (1993) also had annual data and only had to 
extrapolate one year. 
  There is no unique method for adjusting concentration for exports and imports.  For example, 
consider a trigger strategy.  If a firm has excess capacity it can use this to drive down domestic prices at 
will.  Are exports like excess capacity?  If a trigger is “pulled,” can one simply reduce exports and flood 
the domestic market?  This depends upon many imponderables, such as what contracts one has with 
importers elsewhere.  How exports should be treated then depends upon unobservables.  We base the 
numerator of domestic concentration on a measure of domestic sales: total sales net of exports.  So, 









where ˆ eik is an estimate of firm exports under the assumption that the top three firms are exporting at the 
industry average intensity (the denominators are from industry level data and the share numerator is from 
our firm sample data).  Note, eik in the share is a firm’s actual exports. 
 
5.3.  Advertising Intensity 
Although we have not discussed advertising above, we use industry advertising for some model 
specifications, since this is a traditional market power model proxy for product differentiation.  For the 
Advertising-Sales Ratio we use 4-digit industry level data.
28  The advertising expenditure data is obtained 
                                                           
26  Note that at this time Korean debt financing was highly dependent on short term (one year) bank loans. 
27 This measure of capital stock does not include assets unrelated to manufacturing costs (e.g., financial assets and 
land unused in manufacturing). 
28 We have firm level data, but since this is being used as a proxy for differentiation, we feel the industry data are 
better suited.  E.g., advertising differences between auto firms or for one auto firm across time, are not likely to 
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from the advertising expenditures in the Financial Statement Analysis by the Bank of Korea.  Advertising 
is divided by industry total sales that are also available from the same source. 
 
5.4 Data Values 
The data have the following characteristics: 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Max  Min 
CR (3 firm concentration)  0.394  0.179  0.997  0.065 
PCM (price cost margin)  0.142  0.156  0.715  -0.264 
ASR (advertising-sales ratio)  0.013  0.019  0.088  0.0008 
s
D (domestic share of firm in industry)  0.046  0.083  0.785  0.000 
s
X (export share of firm in industry)  0.098  0.175  0.976  0.000 
'
D (ratio: domestic to total firm sales)  0.663 0.319 1.000 0.000 
'




6.  Empirical Model Results 
 
6.1. Test 1:  Superiority-Aggregation Bias?  Accounting Bias? 
  Here we introduce a new methodology to examine whether superiority is driving the concentration-
PCM correlation: we examine a secondary implication of the superiority hypothesis.  The superiority 
hypothesis suggests that firms with a technical advantage which lowers their costs will have both larger 
shares and higher profits than the norm.  When we aggregate to the industry level, the implication is 
highly concentrated industries will have higher profit rates. 
  Now consider the subsample of industries for which the correlation between shares and profits is 
negative.  Here the largest firms have the lowest profits and the lower share firms have profits above the 
norm.
29  Higher concentration (larger leading firms) would imply that industry profits would be lower.  
The key, however, is that only a small fraction of the industry experiences profits above the norm in such 
industries.  Hence, according to the superior firm hypothesis, aggregating to the industry level, 
concentration should no longer be associated with higher profits.  Rather the aggregation effect would 
lead higher concentration to imply lower profits in industries with a negative share-PCM relationship.
30  
Does this subset of industries have greater profits associated with greater concentrations?  More 
specifically, do they have the same positive relationship between concentration and profits as the entire 
sample?  If so, this is what would be predicted by an agreement hypothesis, but this would be inconsistent 
with the aggregation of profits from superior firms. 
  To address these issues we construct standard market power industry cross-sections (later we present 
panel results) for our full sample of 54 industries and run two regressions on this data.  The first is simply 
                                                           
29 The simplest way to conceptualize this is to assume that the lowest profit firms are earning normal profits (not 
exiting).  Then if there is a positive share-profit relationship, the high share firms would be earning higher profits 
than the norm and, conversely, if there is a negative share-profit relationship the small share firms earn profits above 
the norm. 
30 One has to be careful to avoid a fallacy at this point.  Industries with each firm having equal shares and equal 
profits might have all firms earning normal profits, so the negative relationship may be local, but not global.  In 
practice, however, industries have wide size distributions, suggesting that the expected relationship is negative in 
observed data. Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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the standard regression of PCM (price-cost margin) on CR (concentration), the second adds ASR (the 
advertising-sales ratio) to this regression.  These follow the traditional methodology of regressing the 
average industry PCMs over the sample period on the average industry concentrations for the sample 
period.














The CR term in the regression with ASR only meets the 90% significance level whereas alone it meets the 
95% level. 
  We next look at the subsample of the 16 industries out of the original 54 for which there is a negative 
relationship between firm domestic market share and PCM.  The industry PCM is calculated as the sales 













CR is significant at the 95% level for both tests using this subsample; in fact the coefficients are also 
somewhat greater than those of the full sample.
33  Despite a negative relationship between share and the 
PCM for the subsample firms in each industry, there is a positive relationship between the weighted 
average PCMs of these firms and industry concentration. 
  This new methodology addresses a secondary implication of the superiority hypothesis nested with a 
primary implication of the agreement hypothesis.  Finding a positive and significant CR effect for the 
subsample with a negative share PCM relationship supports the agreement hypothesis and rejects the 
                                                           
31 Sometimes advertising is treated as endogenous; Hausman tests sometimes suggest that this need not be the case.  
For our purposes, however, the additional tests we provide demonstrate that the results from our key models are 
insensitive to the inclusion of advertising. 
32 Jeong and Masson (1990) find that other standard variables were not important in Korean data for an earlier time 
period and argue this is because of the high growth rates which lead to the conclusion that firms would not pursue 
limit pricing strategies. 
33 As noted in the previous note, the aggregation argument is not necessarily monotone in concentration for the 
subsample, but certainly the aggregation argument is inconsistent with having parameter estimates at the level of, or 
higher than, those from the full sample. 
PCMk ' 0.0814 % 0.124 CRk R
2 ' 0.076 F' 4.25
(2.98) (2.06)
PCMk ' 0.0735 % 0.084 CRk % 1.94 ASRk R
2 ' 0.278 F' 9.81
(3.00) (1.53) (3.78)
PCMk ' 0.052 % 0.162 CRk R
2 ' 0.204 F' 3.60
(1.24) (1.90)
PCMk ' 0.024 % 0.185 CRk % 1.50 ASRk R
2 ' 0.385 F' 4.07
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implication that the superior firm aggregation bias is the sole factor which leads to the CR correlation 
with PCM. 
  This test was meant to be as close to the traditional  empirical work as possible.  We can gain 
additional insights by exploiting the panel nature of our data.  The panel uses firm level data and includes 
firm fixed effects.  We no longer control for ASR since industry product differentiation is in the firm 
fixed effects.  Obviously other systematic factors, e.g., scale economies, growth, demand elasticity, 
exports, and industry (and firm) accounting conventions, will also be captured in the firm fixed effects.  
We also include three growth rates, the growth in GDP, the growth in Industry Sales and Firm Growth.  
The results for the full sample are: 
 
PCMkt = 0.066 CRkt + 0.117 GDPGrowth + 0.049 Industgrowth + 0.004 FirmGrowth + Fixed Effects  
        (2.86)              (2.37)                         (2.65)                          (1.14)                                               (10) 
   F   =   8 9 . 2 5  
 
and the results for the firms in the 16 industries with a negative share-PCM relationship are: 
 
PCMkt = 0.059 CRkt + 0.125 GDPGrowth + 0.042 Industgrowth + 0.003 FirmGrowth + Fixed Effects  
        (2.05)              (1.97)                         (2.18)                          (0.72)                                               (11) 
   F   =   4 5 . 6 4  
 
CR is significant at the 99% level for the full sample as well as the subsample and the coefficients are 
virtually identical.  By examining the secondary implication of the superiority hypothesis nested with the 
primary implication of the agreement hypothesis, one can certainly reject the proposition that a positive 
share-PCM relationship is “causing” a correlation between CR and PCM.  At a minimum one can reject it 
for the subsample of 16 industries.   
  The parameter estimates for the two panels are nearly identical, and somewhat lower than those for 
the industry cross section.  This fact implies that unobserved firm/industry effects are somewhat 
correlated with observable regressors in the market power cross section model.  Putting in fixed effects 
implies that coefficients of interest are identified by within firm/industry variation over time: “within” 
estimates.  The between industry variation, i.e., regressing the mean of industry PCM’s on the mean of the 
CR’s, as we do in our market power cross section model above, identifies a “between” estimate of the 
parameter.  If the individual effects are not correlated with the observed regressors, both the “within” and 
“between” models estimate the true parameter.  If not, the “between” estimator is biased.  The fact that 
the within estimator is somewhat lower than the between estimator implies there is some omitted variable 
bias problem when omitting the firm/industry effects as is done in most studies. 
  Note what this means regarding the use of traditional modeling with accounting data, at least in our 
Korean sample.  Accounting biases have been hypothesized to be related to industry characteristics in 
such a fashion that they create a positive correlation between industry concentration and accounting 
PCMs.
34  A secondary implication is the “between” model would be biased, but the “within” model would 
not be biased.  The argument that the inter-industry accounting bias fully explains the positive CR-PCM 
relationship would also imply the within results would have zero correlation.  The fact that the within and 
between estimates have roughly the same magnitude of their positive relationship indicates industry 
accounting biases are not totally responsible for causing this relationship.  The positive relationship in the 
within estimates are not predicted by this hypothesis but are predicted by the agreement hypothesis.
35 
                                                           
34 E.g., high capital output ratio firms would have depreciation being more important in profit calculations and high 
capital output ratio industries might be prone to have greater concentration.  If depreciation is mismeasured, this 
could cause an apparent correlation between concentration and profits. 
35 Earlier work (for the U.S. Masson and Shaanan 1982, Geroski, Masson and Shaanan 1987, and for Korea Jeong 
and Masson 1990, Jeong and Masson 2003) finds that entry and structural change are explained by accounting 
profits data in ways one would expect given the  hypotheses.  This provides indirect evidence pertaining to both Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 81  14
  Another criticism of accounting PCM data is that the numerator is price minus average costs, not the 
theoretical marginal costs.  In cost minimization with constant returns to scale in the long run, 
LMC=LAC=SMC=SAC.  But reviewers expressed concern that under rapid growth, firms would possibly 
face capacity constraints.  In our structural model we address the issue of MC…AC.  In our within 
estimator above, however, we see that firm growth has virtually no effect on PCM (as would be implied 
by capacity constraints), whereas both industry growth and GDP growth have strong effects (and virtually 
the same effects in both samples). 
  Finally, reviewers have suggested accounting biases within industries may be correlated with firm 
shares, we test for this when we model MC … AC in a structural model.   
  Note, we have implicitly shown evidence for the Superiority Hypothesis as well as the agreement 
hypothesis.  We found that for 38 of the 54 industries the share-PCM relationship was positive.  If there 
were no superiority effect, we should find that approximately half of our industries would have a positive 
share-PCM relationship.  We can reject the null hypothesis that one half of our industries will have a 
positive PCM slope on share at the 99.5% level (p-value 0.0014) when applying a “zero test”; the 
equivalent to testing how likely it is that one would get 38 heads out of 54 trials with a fair coin.  We go 
further and estimate the magnitude of the superiority effect, that is, how much of our PCM variation is 
attributable to the share effect. 
  We now add structure to the model permitting us to test the “agreement” hypothesis controlling for 
efficiency effects and separating domestic and export PCMs by use of latent variables.  The nonlinear 
regression models we develop next are presented using “within group”
36 estimation (i.e., industry fixed 
effects) which are consistent.
37  (In this non-linear specification it is not feasible to identify purely the 
“between group” effects.) 
 
6.2. Test 2: Conjectures and Concentration 
  Now we turn to the implications of the primary model.  There are multiple papers which consider 
how share and concentration (including interactions) affect PCMs.  Even if the model is not explicitly 
stated, their models contain the same maintained hypothesis that treats demand elasticities as being 
constant across industries.
38  The CDW contribution is to use a structural model by estimating an equation 
derived from oligopoly first order conditions and permitting demand elasticities to be industry specific.  
This inherently is a non-linear model.  They solve this computationally by their multistage procedure.  We 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
whether accounting profits reflect true profitability and whether incumbents or market leaders have superiority 
advantages that others cannot hope to replicate. 
36 The “within group” estimator uses only intertemporal variation in concentration and shares to estimate the 
common parameters.  We say “within group” because the linear within group estimator, using differences from 
means, is typically called the “within” estimator.  Achieving the identical estimates using dummies in a linear model 
is not usually called a “within” estimator.  In a non-linear (or linear) model one can use dummies to achieve the 
within group estimates. 
37 Technically, consistency of the dummy variable estimator in the nonlinear setting requires the number of time 
periods T to grow large.  Intuitively, we have T = 9 observations to estimate each industry’s effect.  Since the model 
is nonlinear, any inconsistency in the industry intercepts is transmitted to the common slopes.  However, Monte 
Carlo evidence (e.g., Heckman 1981) suggests that this inconsistency empirically grows small quickly for models 
without a lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors.  
38 See, for example, the papers reviewed in Scherer et al. (1987).  They assume a structure such as PCM = f(CR,s) + 
$X, where $X are “control variables” or fixed effects.  But, the function f(CR,s) is assumed to be common, hence 
the demand elasticity is assumed to be common even if the control variables are supposed to be controlling for 
demand.  See Machin and Van Reenen (1993) for discussion of a model such as  
PCMikt'[s ikt%(γ0%γ1CRkt)(1&sikt)]/η%fik%gikt  
where the implicitly maintained hypothesis is a common 0 and the firm level fixed effect is said to be for 
unobservables such as management style.  E.g., it is like our later model in which we model the error term as 
gikt'µikt%giktN
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solve this directly with computational methodologies designed for non-linear models dominated by sparse 
matrices. 






There are three new methodologies used here: (1) latent variables to identify the domestic and export 
PCMs; (2) imbedding the latent variable for conjectures in a single step model with industry specific 
demand elasticities; (3) a sparse matrix estimation methodology modified to handle the non-linear model 
fixed effects. 
  As noted above, there are 16 industries with a negative slope on the share variable.  There are also 7 
industries with positive slopes but negative vertical intercepts in this first stage, i.e., these industries 
appear to be “more competitive” than Cournot competition.  Accordingly we look at three samples: (1) all 
54 industries; (2) the 38 industries with the expected positive efficiency relationship between shares and 
PCMs; (3) the 31 industries which have both the expected positive slope and positive intercept (“less 
competitive” than Cournot industries). 
  The third sample is what CDW advocate using.  Our reason for using the full sample is based on the 
following logic.  Suppose all industries are less competitive than Cournot and reflect efficiency effects 
(higher shares associated with higher PCMs).  Sampling is likely to lead to the occurrence of some 
industries for which the ex post samples do not exhibit these a priori properties.  Alternatively, use of the 
subsamples leads to the potential criticism that we are eliminating data which are counter to our ex ante 
hypothesis, biasing our results towards acceptance of our hypothesis. 
  Use of the full sample is equally justified by noting that the conjectures are simply a metric, not to be 
confused with actual behavior (cf. Bresnahan 1989).  The result that the elasticity form of the conjectures 
when " < 0 is not defined as simply as when " > 0 (see note ) might induce one to model the seven 
industries with " < 0 differently.  When " is negative it is close to zero, so we present one model for the 
entire sample.
39  On the other hand, we provide subsample results as well.  Our second and third samples 
which eliminate industries can be compared to the multistage CDW methodology.  We can also examine 
whether the results are robust to the various samples (which they are). 
  The results from this basic model are: 
 
The Basic Non-Linear Model 
 Domestic  Conjecture 




Sample  (0  (1  $2  $3  # industries (observations) 


































t-values are in parentheses.  The relevant critical values are 95% = 1.64; 99% = 2.33; 99.5% = 2.58; and 99.95% = 
3.29. 
                                                           
39 The estimated "’s for the entire sample has a min = -0.01, max = 0.58, mean = 0.22, and a standard 
deviation = 0.12. 
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As was noted for the aggregation tests in the previous section, there was some sensitivity when 
the advertising sales ratio, ASR was added to the traditional model.  Accordingly, we also estimate 
the model with the addition of the ASR in the conjecture term (the product differentiation effects on 
demand elasticity should be captured in the industry specific demand elasticity fixed effects). 
 
 
The Basic Non-Linear Model with ASR 





Sample  (0  (1  (2  $2  $3  # industries (observations) 


























Efficiency hypothesis, " 













(   ) t-values: 95% = 1.64; 99% = 2.33; 99.5% = 2.58; and 99.95% = 3.29.         
  
The crucial coefficient for the hypothesis is (1, the influence of concentration on the conjectural 
variation parameter.  In a one-tailed t-test for each model specification the (1 is strongly significantly 
greater than zero.  Unlike the tests in the earlier section which were based on firm PCM rather than 
on a latent variable for firm domestic PCM, the addition of the ASR does not alter the point estimates 
of (1 by very much.
40 
To understand the importance of letting demand elasticities vary across industries, as do CDW and 
as we do here, we briefly examine the elasticity results.  Using the full sample model, without ASR, our 
mean demand elasticity is 1.70 with a standard deviation of 0.88 with a minimum and maximum value of 
0.25 and 3.87, respectively.  Now consider two firms within an industry with shares sOand sN, with sO = 
$sN, $>1.  Evaluating the predicted PCMs for this industry at an elasticity of the mean plus one standard 
deviation and at an elasticity of the mean level minus one standard deviation, we can inquire how these 
estimates differ.  Clearly the PCM estimates for sN are lower for the higher elasticity.  And for $ > 1 (or sO 
> sN) the PCM is greater for sO.  What is useful to know is the difference between the PCM values for the 
two industries.  If conjectures are Cournot, the PCM of the higher elasticity industry is only 31% of that 
for the lower elasticity industry.  For min and max elasticities the PCM in the more elastic demand 
industry is only 7% of that of the high demand elasticity industry.
41  If we had assumed an additive fixed 
effect (or additive control variables) as in the studies cited in Scherer et al. (1987) or as in Machin and 
Van Reenen (1993), the PCM differences caused by differences between sOand sN would be assumed to be 
identical across all industries, only the levels would change.   
  Another way to see the importance of modeling elasticities is to constrain the elasticities to be the 
same across industries.  When one does so with additive industry fixed effects the full sample t-value on 
                                                           
40 The earlier tests used firm PCM (total sales including exports), whereas the ASR is defined by the domestic 
market.  Furthermore, the 0k fixed effects should capture demand elasticity aspects of ASR. 
41 For conjectures differing from the Cournot level, the difference is more non-linear and cannot be expressed as a 
percentage without specifying the sOand sN values. 
α / γ0 % γ1 CRk % γ2 ASR PCM
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(1 drops from 8.77 to 3.38 (its magnitude drops only slightly to 0.505), and if one uses firm fixed effects, 
as in Machin and Van Reenen (1993), the t-value drops to 2.10.  Additionally, using firm fixed effects, 
the estimated common elasticity is 4.10 which is greater than the maximum industry specific elasticity, 
3.87, measured as an industry fixed effect.  
  One remaining methodological question is how do our more powerful econometric tools’ results 
differ from using the CDW multistage estimation technique?  Using their multistage testing approach we 
reran the model.  First, it is interesting to note that we found the results to be robust in terms of the 
magnitude of the parameter estimates, although the point estimates on (1 are slightly higher with their 
methodology.  For the full sample (which CDW would not use) the coefficient on CR is 0.806 with a 
t-value of 1.78 (which is significant at the 95% level on the appropriate one-tailed test).  For the industries 
matching the efficiency hypothesis that were less competitive than Cournot (their sampling methodology) 
we applied their estimation methodology and found a coefficient of 0.85 and a t-value of 3.49.  Our 
nonlinear one step model provides slightly lower point estimates and far greater precision around the 
point estimates than their multistage methodology.  Finally, it is worthy of note that the superiority effect 
($3) is statistically significant in the export PCM latent variable (we return to this below). 
  Before we analyze the robustness of this test to issues such as product differentiation and the 
potential for MC … AC, we examine the empirical magnitudes.  This is important as we, unlike many 
authors, do not treat the two hypotheses as if they were mutually exclusive “contending” hypotheses, 
instead we find support for both hypotheses in our structural model.  Accordingly, we need to assess how 
important each hypothesis is in terms of actual empirical effects. 
 
6.3. Test 2’s: Empirical Magnitudes 
  Consider an industry with a concentration ratio of 21.5%, which is equal to the sample mean 
concentration ratio of 39.4% minus one standard deviation of 17.9%.  Suppose all three leading firms 
have equal shares of 7.2%.  Consider what would happen if these three firms developed a new technology 
leading concentration to expand to the mean plus a standard deviation, 57.3%. 
  For this hypothetical, evaluating all other values at their means, price would increase by 16.6% and 
the leading firms would have a cost reduction of 7.8%.  Conventional welfare effects are hard to assess 
with the known information even when supposing that producer and consumer surplus are equally 
weighted.  For example, it is unknown how much R&D would have been spent to accomplish this cost 
effect, and furthermore, one would need to make strong assumptions about the costs of the firms which 
lost share.  What we can say, given the mean level of demand elasticity in our estimates, is that the 
leading firms do not come close to tripling their total output when they triple their share: they roughly 
double their output at these lower costs. 
  Given that this is a quantity model, evaluating mergers may be suspect (cf. Salant, Switzer, and 
Reynolds 1983), but suppose that we solely examined the conjectural effect on prices as if the shares were 
predetermined with no cost savings (i.e., raise the concentration ratio without raising shares).  The effects 
would be that price would increase by 17.8%.  That is the agreement effect suggests a 17.8% price 
increase which would be ameliorated by 1.2 percentage points to 16.6% due to the superiority effects.
42 








                                                           
42 Following the Williamson (1968) argument, the cost reductions could be substantial relative to the welfare 
triangle effect.  Alternatively, following Posner (1975), the welfare gains from the cost reductions may be eroded by 
the rent seeking expenditures to obtain them (e.g., high R&D costs). Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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6.4. Test 3: Robustness to Product Differentiation and Possible MC ≠ AC Biases 
  
6.4.1. Is Use of the Accounting PCM Leading to a MC ≠ AC Bias Problem? 
  It has been hypothesized
43 that AC may be unequal to MC in a systematic fashion which is correlated 
with concentration.
44  Since we posit a structural model, this can be tested directly by altering the 
structure to nest this hypothesis.






The change is that the error term is now                      .  The first term is assumed to have a non-zero mean 
and is firm, industry and time varying.  By modeling          we can incorporate various ways in which 
MC…AC might create biased estimates of the basic model. 
  Suppose the measurement of MC is not equal to the measurement of AC.  We have the accounting 
identity                                                            where PCM
Os are the “Observed” accounting PCMs based 




















Using the superscript T for the “Theoretical” PCM based on MC we have 
  The bias argument comes from a variety of reviewers.  One argument is that the measurement of 
MC-AC is non-zero and positively correlated with domestic concentration (leading to the possibility 
of a positive observed PCM-CR relationship without this being “caused” by behavior).  This 
argument is based in part on economies of scale, which would be related to the share of industry 
shipments, si
I (the superscript indicates the Industry share of production for both export and domestic 
markets).  Reviewers have also hypothesized that accounting biases may also be related to firm 
shares in industries, so including si can cover both potentials for MC … AC bias.  To capture this 
suppose                                                                 , indexing P
X to equal 1, also supposing that  
                                                           
43 E.g., by journal reviewers. 
44 E.g., greater economies of scale may lead to a higher concentration.  The effects of economies of scale on the 
costs of firms in observed equilibria are, in our opinion, not likely to be great, but the argument has a priori validity. 
45  A model which is motivated by theory, but does not have the non-linear structure implied by the theory, cannot 
address this issue. 
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As we demonstrate later, estimating P
D/P
X'φ0%φ1(CR  leads to  φ0>1 and φ1>0.  (This cancels 
out the cost terms in the PCMs, serving as another test which should be robust to MC … AC regardless of 
the reasons for this difference.) 
  This model led to (1 rising from 0.649 to 0.658 and its t-value dropping slightly from 8.77 to 7.59. 
  Following this another reviewer discussed measures of economies of scale. [S]he posited that 
measures such as firm share and concentration might be correlated with economies of scale differences 
between MC and AC in such fashion as to drive our results.  Recall that Korean manufacturing doubled 
over the period of the data, so we construct an alternative to share which is “size.”  This is firm sales at 
time t divided by industry sales at time zero (sales deflated by the industry price index).  We add this to 
the model as size
-1, as would be the case if there were a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost.  This 
reviewer also argued that the capital output ratio would be a proxy for an industry with economies of 
scale, so this is added to the specification of the error term.  Note that our size
-1 variable is a measure of 
size which, if taken alone would be like assuming economies of scale to be the same across industries.  If 
economies of scale indeed vary across industries in a fashion related to K/O, then one can think of an 
economies of scale coefficient which varies by capital intensity.  So, to capture economies of scale we 
add a measure of economies of scale given by (δ4%δ5(K/O)(size
&1
. 
  At the same time yet another reviewer was concerned with adjustment costs and sunk costs.  We 
added firm sales growth (deflated by the industry price index), “Gro,” and following the argument of the 
reviewer that these would be more prevalent in higher capital cost industries we again use K/O and 
estimate (δ6%δ7(K/O)(Gro.  Note that to get sales growth we need to truncate the first year of data for 
each firm.  Further, it is possible that “unexpected” growth could create a deviation between MC and AC.  
Given that we have a fairly short time series, if we used lagged sales growth to proxy for expected 
growth, we would lose much of our data.  We instead constructed each firm’s mean growth and then 
constructed its deviations from its mean for each time period, DGro, and treated it like Gro as having a 
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(MC-AC), the MC…AC Bias term 
 























The parameter values for the conjectural term are virtually unchanged by the adjustments.  In 
particular, the crucial parameter (1 rises slightly from 0.649 to 0.716 and its t-value drops slightly from 
8.77 to 5.98, but still remains very highly significant.  The export PCM estimates change somewhat more, 
but not by a considerable amount.  This brings us to the bias adjustment parameters.  None of these are 
significant at even the 90% level except for the constant term and the addition of these terms is only 
jointly significant at the 85% level.  The point estimates suggest that as CR rises, MC falls relative to AC 
(the opposite sign than the first reviewer conjectured
46), and that as firm share rises, MC falls relative to 
AC as well, but neither effect is significant and the terms do not lead to lower significance in the 
estimates of the key parameters.  Furthermore, these suggest, as in the within estimator results in the 
linear model, that firm growth is not causing a substantial deviation between MC and AC due to capacity 
constraints. 
  Finally, the domestic to export price ratio is very poorly fitted in terms of its t-values.  When we 
directly estimate this price ratio in a later section the parameter N0 is virtually the same as above (1.12 
rather than 1.18 above)  but the t-value is very high.  The point estimate later for N1 is 0.12 with a t-value 
of 7.14, whereas here it is 0.26.  But using the standard deviation here, 0.12 is about half a standard 
deviation from the 0.26 here.  The similarity of the point estimates (which apriori could have been wildly 
different from the entirely different methodologies used to estimate them) is additional support for the 
legitimacy of our model results.  The resulting conclusion is that these adjustments do show some 
                                                           
46 The conjecture was that if (P - MC)/P were to remain unchanged by a greater CR then a greater CR could be 
associated with a greater (P - AC)/P if AC were to fall relative to MC. 
α / γ0 % γ1 CR PCM
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potential validity to the proposition that there might be some deviation between MC and AC, but that the 
magnitude of the bias as it pertains to the estimates of the basic model is small. 
  One point should be made in closing.  Parameters are being identified by functional form, as is usual 
in structural models.  Were exports zero, the bias part of the model and the basic part of the model would 
be highly colinear; what is primarily identifying this model is that the bias of MC relative to AC must 
inherently be affecting production for both domestic and export markets whereas the market power results 
apply to the domestic market alone.  Whether the same test could be usefully applied to data without 
exports and variance in exports, appears to be doubtful to us. 
 
6.4.2. Testing for Product Differentiation Bias 
  There are numerous papers following Cowling and Waterson (1976) which have used the 
homogeneous goods model to motivate traditional IO empirical models with data sets which are not 
entirely composed of homogeneous product industries.  They point out that in a conjectural model,  
PCM = "H/0, or for an industry this is the conjecture times the Herfendahl divided by the demand 
elasticity.  This logic has been applied at the line-of-business level as well.  But these models (cf. Machin 
and Van Reenen 1993; Kwoka and Ravenscraft 1986; Rosenbaum and Manns 1994) are not structural in 
that they have universally treated demand elasticity as if it were uniform across industries and they have 
incorporated “control variables” in an additive fashion. 
  A critique of this entire path of research is that it is based on the homogeneous products model.  
Suppose the true situation is that product differentiation is both substantial and ubiquitous.  As Dixit 
(1986) points out, although the comparative statics of homogeneous goods oligopolies in conjectural 
models are simple, for heterogeneous goods, once one moves past monopoly and duopoly, there is little 
that can be said about the comparative statics without a precise form of the demand structure.  We 
perform three tests to analyze product differentiation.  First, we move from the assumption of an industry 
specific demand elasticity in the estimation of equation (6) to assuming firm specific demand elasticities.  
This permits virtually any demand structure and allows for the data to directly pick up any firm specific 
PCM relationship, such as one leading to a negative share-PCM relationship.  This specification does still 
imply that the conjectures are similar to those in the homogeneous products case.  Little changes in this 
highly general demand structure model.  The homogeneous product model results are  
α'&0.055%0.649(CR  with a t-value of 8.77 and the firm specific demand elasticity model results are  
α'&0.126%0.729(CR with a t-value of 4.60.  Although this permits virtually any demand system, this 
is no longer a structural model in the sense that the conjectures and share equations are based on the 
homogeneous goods conjectures (e.g., all rivals are equally close as in symmetric differentiation). 
  Second we follow Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984) and introduce a specific demand structure 
capable of making the heterogeneous products case into a true structural model.  They assume that  
Mpi/Mxj ' κ(Mpi/Mxi), where 6 is a measure of product differentiation (6 = 1 implies homogeneous 
products and 6=0 implies completely unrelated products).
47  Assuming that 6 is an industry wide constant, 







This implies not only firm specific demand elasticities but another share effect and the product 
differentiation effect.  To implement this as a structural model we continue to assume that 
                                                           
47  Although this demand structure permits firm asymmetries in total demand, it assumes that an increase in the 
quantity of any one rival has the same effect on firm demand as the increase in quantity of any other rival. 
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α / γ0%γ1(CR .  We model industry product differentiation as κ / ω1%ω2(ASR.  The resulting 
estimation is now α'&0.013%0.395(CR with the t-value on CR equal to 2.83 and 
κ ' 0.823&0.257(ASR with the t-value for T1 < 1 (where T1=1 and T2=0 implies homogeneous 
goods) being only 0.741.  The T2, however, is negative (as predicted) and significant with a t-value of 
2.49. 
  Third, we divide the sample in half and examine the results for the 27 industries which have the 
lowest advertising sales ratios.  This takes us from Steel Rolling and Extruding, with A/S=0.08% 
[Advertising=0.0008*Sales], to Products from Metal Forging, Pressing, Metallurgy, A/S=0.46%.  These 
are with little doubt about as close to homogeneous product markets as one can get.  With this subsample 
we ran the full model, including the MC-AC bias terms.  The results were α'&0.036%0.832(CR, with 
a t-value of 6.95 on the concentration term.  The results are similar to, but the point estimates are slightly 
stronger than, the full sample results. 
  One might argue that our results are biased due to the inclusion of differentiated products in a test 
using a structural model of homogeneous product markets.  Our interpretation is that we have a good 
model of the central tendencies of concentration/agreement, holding share/superiority constant.   
  Following the tests of both MC…AC bias and product differentiation bias it is our view that most of 
the evidence on the measurement of the conjectures is consistent with the homogeneous goods model 
providing reasonably reliable structural results.  This is not to say that, for example, product 
differentiation is irrelevant, it is to assert that it does not appear to have a major effect on the results.  In 
terms of point estimates, the concentration effect, ˆ γ1, is slightly lower in the basic model than in the other 
models, so the estimated concentration price effects are more conservative in the basic model.   
Accordingly, we used our basic model and the full data set for our empirical magnitudes presented above 
and for the set of tests which we present next. 
 
6.5. Test 3:  Domestic/Export Price Discrimination 
  Again we turn to a secondary implication of the models for our methodology.  This has more than 
one important feature.  First, we can test if domestic prices are greater than export prices, as would be 
expected in an agreement model.  Secondly, we can examine whether our latent variables for domestic 
and export PCMs are “reasonable” in what should be expected from a model with domestic and foreign 
sales.  (E.g., one would question the latent variables in the above section if they predicted that export 
prices vastly exceeded domestic prices.)  This model has not only the ability to test for the determinants 
of the price ratio but can help substantiate that the latent variables used in the primary causality model in 
the second set of tests match a priori expectations.  Finally, since this price ratio cancels out the AC part 
of the PCM measures, if AC…MC, this is not as problematic as it would be in the above tests. 
  The following tests continue to use the sparse matrix methodology.  There will now be two fixed 
effects, doubling the numbers of zeros in the XNX matrix.  In this section we no longer constrain the 
conjectures to be the same function of CR across industries.  We also allow conjectures to be industry 
specific fixed effects.  Our new methodology here is employing a new latent variable which can be 
derived from the same basic model: we identify the domestic to export price ratio of each firm as a latent 
variable which is treated as a common function of CR. 
  In the traditional model it is surmised that export markets are close to competitive and domestic 
markets may or may not be close to competitive.  If this hypothesis has validity for the Korean 
manufacturing sector, it would be expected that high concentration Korean exporters act as price 
discriminating oligopolists, exploiting market power in domestic markets, while being close to price 
takers in export markets.  Yang and Hwang (1994) look into the behavior of Korean domestic and export 
prices for six broad manufacturing sectors.  They find export prices moving with international markets, 
yet domestic prices move with domestic factors.  From this they conclude that there is domestic price 
discrimination and hence domestic market power.  They do not, however, provide a direct link between 
market structure and evidence of domestic market power. 
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That is, we can directly find the ratio of domestic to export prices if we have the relevant PCMs.  To the 
extent that export and domestic products (or product mixes) are not identical, we are finding the ratio of 
domestic price over export price where units are indexed to a common marginal cost of production. 
  Let us return to our basic model but with the conjecture, "k, being an industry fixed effect.  That is, 
we do not constrain "k to be a common function of CR, but leave it “free.”  Now we have That is, we can 
directly find the ratio of domestic to export prices if we have the relevant PCMs.  To the extent that 
export and domestic products (or product mixes) are not identical, we are finding the ratio of domestic 
price over export price where units are indexed to a common marginal cost of production. 
  Let us return to our basic model but with the conjecture, "k, being an industry fixed effect.  That is, 




















we can test whether domestic prices are above export prices and whether the degree to which they exceed 
export prices is related to market structure.  A priori, N0 $ 1 and N1 $ 0 suggest that on average all 
industries have domestic prices at least at or above export prices.  Furthermore, if N1 > 0 and is 
significant, this would support the domestic market power hypothesis. 
  In this environment with industry effects, constrained estimation is not straightforward.
48  O u r  
alternative is to estimate the conjectural model, as above, but with a new set of assumptions.  We no 
longer restrict "k to be a common function of the concentration ratio; we let "k be an industry specific 
fixed effect along with the 0k fixed effect.  (The conjecture term as a fixed effect basically means that we 
let the industries’ best fit on firms share drive the PCM estimation.)  Given the parameter estimates from 
this model, one can construct predicted values for the price ratio for each firm and year combination in 
the data.  We can then regress the price ratios on industry concentration to examine the hypotheses. 
  In principle, one would like this regression to take account of the variance of the predicted price 
ratio.  That is, we would like a “one step model,” as in our second set of tests, to place higher weight on 
firm-year observations for which the predicted price ratio is more precise, the equivalent of having a two 
                                                           
48 If the constraints were exact functions of the parameters, one could substitute the constraints through and 
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step model using a GLS approach to factor in the variances in the second stage regression.  The one step 
approach is no longer feasible, and in our setting the computation of the variance of the price ratio is 
rather involved, so given that our method is consistent and the results are strong, we choose to only use an 
OLS regression instead.
49  This regression will account for some of the variance differences.  Industries 
with more firms/observations, which are those for which we expect tighter estimates of the industry 
effects, will enter the second stage OLS regression more times and will therefore carry more weight in the 
regressions. 
  The results follow: 
 
Domestic to Export Price Ratio Nonlinear Model 
  
Sample  φ0  φ1 
# of Industries (observations)
Full  1.12 





Efficiency hypothesis, all 
industries 
1.10 





Efficiency hypothesis, supra 
Cournot 
1.11 





(   ) t-values; [   ] t-values for the hypothesis N0 > 1; and each t-value exceeds 3.29 = 99.95%. 
 
 
Keeping in mind that the model includes share effects, i.e., controls for the superiority effect, the CR 
effect is in addition to any superiority effect and should be interpreted as an agreement effect.  There is a 
strong relationship between domestic concentration and the degree of domestic price discrimination 
which is evidenced by a N1 > 0 and a t-value greater than 7.14 for all samples.  Furthermore, there is 
strong support for the hypotheses of even low concentration industries have higher domestic prices than 
export prices, N0 > 1 (t-values in [  ]’s, all of which exceed 13).  The former result, N1 > 0, is a secondary 
implication of the market power agreement hypothesis.  N0 > 1 (but not greater by a significant amount) 
demonstrates that the latent variables developed in this study have empirical validity.
50 
  Recalling that the superiority effect is demonstrated for export PCMs in the second set of tests, this 
only reenforces the interpretation that market power is generating this result.  For example, higher export 
shares, to the extent that they are related to higher concentration, lead to higher export prices conditioned 
on costs.  The denominator is inflated by the higher concentration, yet the ratio is still positive in CR and 
is highly significant. 
  The results from tests 1, 2, and 3 on Korean Line-of-Business data are consistent with the agreement 
hypothesis, even after controlling for the superior firm or efficiency hypothesis.  These results are 
statistically strong and survive three levels of scrutiny: (1) for those industries for which the superior 
                                                           
49 In a sense, we are using a sequential approach similar to the less powerful CDW approach we reference above.  A 
GLS estimator should be more efficient (have a lower variance) but should have the same expected values for 
parameters.  Since none of our relevant t-values are less than 7.00, this appears to be the rational way to continue. 
50 Exports may be even more competitive than low concentration domestic markets for a variety of 
reasons.  For example, product differentiation.  Domestic consumers may look at “brand names,” whereas 
importers may solicit bids to ascertain which firm will offer the lowest price to produce a product after 
which they have a foreign brand added for the sale elsewhere.  Even without branding, the individual firm 
demand elasticity in exports may be lower than domestically.  Furthermore, importers may have more 
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efficiency hypothesis is not supported, the agreement hypothesis is still supported using a traditional test; 
(2) controlling for firm shares to capture the superior efficiency hypothesis, the effect of concentration on 
a hypothetical conjectural variations parameter is statistically strong; (3) the hypothesis that 
domestic/export price discrimination would be positively related to concentration is also supported with 
strong statistical significance.  Finally, even with statistical support for the superiority effect, the 




7. Our Results Contrasted with U.S. LOB Studies 
 
The published FTC-LOB studies generally looked at primary model implications and found that after 
controlling for the market shares of individual firms, concentration had no independent effect on firm 
profit levels (indeed, its influence was typically negative).  Why are our results diametrically opposite to 
these? 
  One obvious answer is that the U.S. and Korean economies are entirely different.  The U.S. economy 
is, for example, mature.  Results from an earlier period, 1978-82, suggest that the Korean markets 
deviated further from a structural equilibria than do markets in mature economies (Jeong and Masson 
2003).  For the U.S., the 1970s FTC-LOB data come from a period that included price controls (and their 
removal), an energy crisis (major energy price inflation), a unique period of “stagflation” (high inflation 
and high unemployment), and the end of the Vietnam War.
51  Other contrasts include greater reliance on 
information technologies in the U.S., which could allow for more rapid competitive adjustments when 
pockets of power emerge.
52 
  Another major difference may be attributed to the disparity of antitrust enforcement in the two 
countries.  In Korea, if major mergers are permitted, sufficient unilateral firm power not matched by the 
cost decreases associated with our equilibrium model may lead to estimates that suggest a high ".  Also, 
agreements may be simpler to achieve in Korea when antitrust laws and enforcement are weak.   
  Additionally, there is some related evidence which suggests that the FTC-LOB studies may be 
misleading for the U.S.  First there are some temporal effects which we shall document with secondhand 
statistical evidence.  Second, there have been two studies with the FTC data which suggest that when 
using different methodologies the agreement hypothesis may still be relevant.  Third, these studies use a 
combination of national firm shares, yet they use average geographic market concentration levels.  This 
favors the superior firm hypothesis, as we shall see.  Despite the vast number of papers with similar 
conclusions, they are not independent tests: they are all using the same data set which contains only a 
limited number of time period.  Idiosyncratic aspects of the data will have similar effects across the tests. 
  We look first at some temporal factors, noting that this potentially valuable source of U.S. LOB data 
was only collected for a short number of atypical years before the program was destroyed in Reagan era 
politics (for the demise of the program see Scherer 1990).  There are numerous hypotheses about the 
behavior of PCMs over business cycles, which are reviewed in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (DHP) 
                                                           
51 For the years of 1974-77 unemployment was 5.5%, 8.3%, 7.6%, and 6.9%, respectively; inflation was 12.2%, 
7.0%, 4.8%, and 6.8%, respectively; energy inflation was 21.6%, 11.6%, 6.9%, and 7.2%, respectively.  For 1973-77 
energy prices rose by over 80 percent, whereas general inflation (including energy) rose by less than 50%.  High 
energy use industries had far different cost structure changes than low energy use industries.  If energy use is 
correlated with minimum optimal scale, then it should be correlated with concentration.  Also, if energy sellers (e.g., 
gasoline) are correlated with concentration and if energy has quasi-rents (i.e., upward sloping short run supply) this 
may lead to biased results. 
52 Another possibility is that the Chaebol structure leads to multimarket contacts (MMC) and mutual forbearance.  
Feinberg (1985) finds some evidence of this in the FTC-LOB data, while he still has the standard FTC negative 
result on C4 and profits.  Given the looser structure of Chaebols relative to U.S. conglomerates, we would expect a 
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(1986a, 1986b) where they analyze a panel of 284 industries.  DHP (1986b) shows traditional cross-
sectional regressions of PCM on (extrapolated) CR4 for each year from 1958 through 1981.  The 
concentration effect in 1972 is lower than in any of the 14 previous years, it falls again in 1973 and 1974 
where it remains at half its historic levels thereafter.  Using a panel model, they attribute this to the high 
level of unemployment in these years (see note ). 
  Using a different methodology, Mueller and Sial (1993) also present annual regressions for the U.S. 
over the period of 1958-1990, extending past the period of the DHP results.  Despite a different 
methodology (more aggregate industry definitions), their concentration coefficients for 1958-1981 have a 
correlation of 0.72 with those estimated by DHP (t-value = 4.90).  In their paper only two years out of the 
thirty-three have negative CR effects on profits, 1974 is one of these.  For ten of their years the 
coefficients are not positive and significant at the 95% level.  The first time the coefficient drops below 
the 95% level is 1973, becoming significant again in 1977 (at the 99% level).  Their weak results are 
associated with the FTC-LOB time period.  Mueller and Sial associate the periods of insignificance with 
inflation as opposed to the unemployment focus of DHP (of course, the period of the 1970s was one of 
stagflation, see note ).
53,54 
  Ghosal (2000), rather than looking at unemployment or inflation, looks at the influence of monetary 
policy and the influence of the relative price of energy on PCMs.  He analyzes a panel for 1958-1991.  He 
finds that both monetary policy and relative energy price changes influence low CR industries differently 
than high CR industries.  For high CR industries a rise in energy prices relative to the producer price 
index leads to lower PCMs in the following year.  For low CR industries it leads to (a statistically 
insignificant) rise.  Given the substantial energy price increases in the mid 1970s, this should lower the 
cross-section CR effect on PCMs, as he notes. 
  These results all suggest that the only period for which the FTC-LOB data were collected was highly 
unusual with respect to the CR relationship with PCM.  There are also two papers using the FTC-LOB 
data which find positive CR effects.  One paper is Scott and Pascoe (1986).  They hypothesize that during 
these turbulent years the high capital cost industries would have a breakdown in coordination.  Testing, 
they find that CR has a positive effect in lower capital-output ratio industries (significance of the CR 
effect for these industries is not clear). 
  Ross (1987) applies the CDW methodology by first applying a screen that only permits an industry 
to be included in the test if its share effect on PCM was significant at the 10% level.  Starting with a one 
year FTC sample of over 250 industries used by others (some authors used subsamples, but typically 
these were also large), this criterion left him with only 28 industries.  In this paper he finds the four firm 
concentration is weakly related to PCMs and the Herfendahl index is negatively related to PCMs.  But, of 
his 28 sample industries, half (14) are misc.,n.e.c.,n.s.k. or etc. industries, “industries” which are 
definitionally mixtures of products.
55 
                                                           
53 Salinger (1990) also finds a decreased effect in the 1970s, but finds it is restored in the early 1980s.  His 
interpretation of this differs from ours.  He looks at price and margin changes over a decade starting in 1972 as they 
relate to changing concentration.  Again, we would argue that the atypical time period of that decade makes drawing 
inferences difficult. 
54 These also correspond with the energy crisis periods of 1973-74 and 1979-80. 
55 We provide only one of many possible examples from his sample.  The 4 digit “hardware n.e.c.” includes five 
digit sub industries such as  “vacuum . . . bottles . . . and chests” with CR = 93%; furniture hardware, CR = 38% 
(e.g., drawer slides and casters); builders’ hardware, CR = 29% (e.g., padlocks, safes, closet shelving, screen door 
closers, and hinges); motor vehicle hardware, CR  = 83% (e.g., door handles and license plate brackets); other 
hardware n.e.c. CR=23% (e.g., saddlery hardware, casket hardware and fireplace fixtures).  Weiss and Pascoe used 
judgment and other means to try to calculate the average concentration ratio for many industries.  For example, they 
adjusted  denominators for imports, tried to find geographic concentration ratios for geographically dispersed 
industries, and for industries like “hardware” they tried to find the average across the various sub industries.  These 
data were the primary concentration source of the FTC-LOB papers.  The Weiss-Pascoe “hardware” weighted 
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  Recognizing the industry definition problem, in 1988 Ross completely redid his estimation using a 
balanced panel covering the period 1975-77.  Not wishing to use subjective industry inclusion methods he 
applied the Bradburd and Ross (1988) criteria, eliminating not only the catchall industries, but also 
eliminating industries for which the five digit sub industries in the Census have widely diverging 
concentration ratios.  The logic behind this sample selection criterion is that if the four digit industry is 
“an industry of competitors” then it should in fact be that the five digit sub industries should appear to be 
structured like an aggregated four digit industry in terms of competitors.  He includes all industries with 
positive slopes and intercepts in the profits-share regressions.  Applying these criteria he only had 43 
remaining industries, but now he uses three years of data.  Regressing  
func{" horz -50 vert 30 \^} on concentration leads to a positive effect for the Herfendahl, with a t-value = 
1.72, and the CR4 has a t-value = 1.81 (both are significant at the 95% level). 
  Industry definition problems may be playing a role in the other FTC-LOB studies.  The importance 
of industry definitions especially when comparing share effects with concentration effects deserves 
some deeper discussion.  Although others have discussed the industry definition problem in detail in the 
context of market power testing, we are not aware of much discussion with regards to the implications to 
superiority – efficiency hypothesis testing.  Accordingly we replicate some known results, along with 
stating their implications for tests which involve both superiority and agreement testing.  Suppose that 
some U.S. LOB data are based on industries which have sub industries which are not really in the same 
market.  Suppose one SIC industry has two equal sized sub industries, one with higher concentration than 
the other due to differences in economies of scale or simply historical accident.  Suppose further that the 
Weiss-Pascoe data used by the LOB researchers in fact has the correct average concentration (they use the 
weighted average of geographically and otherwise adjusted 5-digit concentrations).  Also suppose that the 
superiority effect is zero whereas the agreement hypothesis is correct.  Finally, for simplicity, suppose 
that the top four firms in each sub industry are equally sized.  The result is that the concentration number 
will be the correct average, the higher concentration sub industry will have higher PCMs, and 
furthermore the top four market share firms for the “full industry” will all be in the concentrated market 
and have higher PCMs than the “lower share” firms located in the less concentrated industry.  That is, 
by constructing a hypothetical industry based on the traditional “agreement” effect, but with no 
superiority effect, we find that there will be an artificial share-profits relationship and that concentration is 
at best only measured with error.
56 
  There are even stronger conclusions about aggregation bias.  Under Census definitions, an industry 
may be defined by a “like product or process.”  Suppose that there is no market rivalry between the two 
sub industries, but that there is a shared technology.  One obvious example is a regional industry for the 
same product, it could also be a technological commonality across different nationally sold products.  
Suppose that one firm develops a better technology.  The logical consequence would be that this firm, if 
located in one sub industry, would acquire (or otherwise enter) the other sub industry (which would be 
permitted under U.S. antitrust laws).  It would also have higher PCMs in each sub industry.  Of course 
firm share and concentration in each sub industry should go up as well.  But note, the equilibrium market 
by market share and concentration increase will be far smaller than the firm increase in national share.
57
                                                           
56 Using the above assumptions, suppose one “industry” has sub industries with CR of 40 and 60 and another 
“industry” has CR of 30 and 70.  Both will have the same “industry” average CR.  Thus, the CR effect on leading 
firm PCM will be zero even though the latter “industry” would have higher PCMs under the agreement hypothesis.  
Yet, the share effect will be positive (leading firms in the latter “industry” will have greater shares and PCMs). 
57  Consider the following entry-acquisition game.  Suppose there are three firms and two markets and the first stage 
is an entry stage.  L draws low costs and H1 and H2 draw high costs.  Each market can support two firms, but only 
two firms.  The set of pure strategy equilibria for each market are {L,H1}, {L,H2}, {H1,H2}.  Before the market 
game, the second stage permits Pareto improving ownership transactions, but does not permit mergers within a 
market.  Then for any market with {H1,H2} L will purchase one of the players, without loss of generality call it 
player H1, at a price offering H1 its profits were the outcome to be {L,H1} (the alternative to purchasing player H2).  
The resulting pure strategies for the two markets are {{L,H1},{L,H1}}, {{L,H1},{L,H2}}, {{L,H2},{L,H1}}, 
{{L,H2},{L,H2}}.  Then obtain the market outcome (which in our context need not be Nash in quantities) and Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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  If the only data available does not include “local market share,” the structural model cannot be well 
defined whereas the Demsetz argument clearly leads to L being in every served market (e.g., having a 
large “national” share).  If the market equilibrium is as per our model, the " conjecture would be based on 
the local “concentration” were this an N firm market, which is what the LOB researchers state is “on 
average” what they have in their Weiss-Pascoe data.  So, to apply our testing framework to U.S. data, we 
would need a richer model or a data set comprised of only national industries.  This is a superiority effect, 
but one which is artificially inflated relative to the individual market superiority hypothesis.  This bias 
results towards finding a (national) firm share to profit relationship at the same time that geographic 
differences in concentration, by being averaged, create errors in the variables that measure market 
concentration. 
  For example, before McDonald’s came into existence hamburgers were mostly sold by local or 
regional firms.  McDonald’s clearly developed a superior product (regardless of our personal preferences) 
and rapidly changed the market (followed by Burger King, Wendy’s, etc.).  City by city, concentration in 
hamburgers may have been altered little but the national shares of these chains have exploded.  These new 
firms presumably out earned their predecessor rivals.  What is not clear is what would have been the 
pricing effects in small towns with only a few rivals versus more densely populated areas.  In any case, 
the Weiss-Pascoe technique, if used for hamburger local markets, would simply give an average level of 
concentration/rivalry.
58 
  The tests on the FTC-LOB data are not independent.  The time period of these appears to be one for 
which standard models of market power have anomalous results.  There are reasons to believe that for 
U.S. data the firm share effect on PCM would be enhanced by cross market expansions of superior firms, 
whereas the concentration effects would be weakened by averaging across markets. 
  In short, the FTC-LOB studies have flaws, not of their authors’ making, which compromise their 
conclusions.  The data come from a highly atypical time period, a time period for which traditional 
agreement tests fail, when they do not fail before or after this period.  And, given the U.S. data has 
geographically dispersed markets, the methods used are inherently biased towards accepting the 
superiority hypothesis (as they certainly should do), but are stacked against the agreement hypothesis by 





  The seminal work on oligopolistic “agreement” by Bain in the early 1950s was questioned by the 
seminal paper by Demsetz in 1973 positing that the “superior efficiency” of firms in dynamic competition 
could explain Bain’s evidence.  The influential Scherer and Ross text (1990, p. 411) states that the “main 
question” in empirical industrial organization in the late twentieth century was research trying to sort out 
these two “contending” hypotheses.  Eight LOB researchers (Scherer et al. 1987) stated that the 
“deadlock” between these two hypotheses was broken with the FTC-LOB studies and declared the 
“superiority hypothesis” the “winner”! 
  Since this time there has been a general presumption on many economists’ parts that the role of 
industrial concentration on “agreement” was vastly overstated in earlier years.  There is no doubt that 
pure cross sectional analyses could be biased due to superior firm effects, but without LOB data there is 
no way to address how much these results are biased.  The FTC-LOB studies suggested that this bias was 
a major cause, or more likely the sole cause, of the observed profits-concentration correlation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
implied profits.  Permitting mixed strategies in the first stage leads to a positive probability of some markets with L 
alone following the second stage (assuming that if an H is the sole entrant the purchase price negotiations lead to a 
cooperative game equilibrium).  There is also a positive probability of an unserved market and a positive probability 
of “over entry,” with negative profits (at least for the H types). 
58  A related observation is hence that the structural model cannot be estimated on U.S. data unless one knew market 
by market share and concentration (e.g., if one were to use only national industries). Oligopolistic "Agreement" and/or “Superiority”?: New Findings from New Methodologies and Data                      Jakubson et al. 
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literature.  This perception has had profound impacts not only on academic thought but on how U.S. 
merger policy and privatization policy has evolved in recent decades. 
  We construct a new LOB data set for Korea, a panel from 1987 through 1995.  We analyze the 
“superiority” and “agreement” hypotheses using four new methodologies incorporated into three different 
types of tests.  We first examine the “superiority” hypothesis contention that reduced form tests simply 
aggregate superior high share firms’ high profits in such a fashion that it creates a correlation between 
concentration and profits.  We show that even when firm shares are negatively related to profits, 
concentration and profits are still positively correlated; the opposite result from the aggregation bias 
supposed by the “superiority” hypothesis. 
  Next we develop a structural model.  Its theoretical structure is often cited in the literature examining 
the agreement hypothesis, but these studies then jump from this “justification” to ad hoc specifications 
rather than estimating the non-linear system implied by the theory.  We directly estimate the non-linear 
structural model and show that this test is far more powerful.  In order to do so we need to introduce 
sparse matrix techniques which have not been used in this literature.  In this section we also examine 
structural models in which product differentiation is explicitly introduced and a subsample of firms for 
which we know that product differentiation is low.  The results remain similar to the basic model.  We 
also identify the potential gap between MC and AC (if they differ) as a systematic factor in the error term.  
Empirical magnitudes from this estimation suggest that the model has a very strong fit (e.g., crucial t-
values far greater than the 99% level) and that both the “superiority” and “agreement” hypotheses are 
valid.  This being said, the results demonstrate that the “agreement” hypothesis vastly outweighs the 
superiority hypothesis in terms of price effects. 
  We then move to an entirely new indirect method to identify firms’ domestic prices relative to their 
export prices.  This is embedded in our structural model and the result is that domestic prices exceed 
export prices and the amount by which they exceed export prices increases with increases in 
concentration. 
  All of our tests support both the “superiority” and “agreement” hypotheses; the “agreement” effects, 
however, empirically dominate the “superiority” effects in price formation.  Finally we examine the FTC-
LOB studies for the U.S. and demonstrate why these appear to not be robust to the time period for which 
the data was collected and why they may be inherently biased due to geographic considerations which we 
do not have to deal with in our Korean data. 
  We have established the primae facie case that agreement effects are substantial, at least when 
antitrust policy is weak.  Our evidence establishes the importance of having effective antitrust policies, 
including merger policy, based on more than “unilateral effects,” including the actuality that, at least 
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Appendix: One Stage Estimation with Sparse Matrices 
 
The panel data problem is simply a “cluster sampling” where we are concerned about a “cluster 
specific” effect.  In our problem the “cluster” is an industry (a cluster of firms observed over time). 
  Our fixed effects estimation treats the cluster/industry specific effects as another set of 
parameters to be estimated.  Since our problem is non-linear in its parameters, use of standard panel 
“differences from means” cannot be used.  The differences from means in linear models can be 
replicated via the use of dummy variables for fixed effects.  In principle, one could think about 
adding dummy variables to our model for each cluster/industry to the right hand side of the model.  
In practice, this may fail to be efficient because, as we will see below, the matrix to be inverted is 
"sparse," dominated by zeroes.  Since an exact zero does not exist in floating point arithmetic, there 
is the danger of accumulating nontrivial roundoff errors by simply putting in the dummies.  This is 
especially problematic in non-linear models, as is ours. 
  What we will do, then, is use the special structure of the problem to find expressions which are 
analytically the same as what we would have gotten by simply putting in the dummies.  These 
expressions, however, will not require us to invert large sparse matrices.  Chamberlain (1980) 
showed the comparable expressions for the maximum likelihood case.  We will do the nonlinear least 
squares case here. 
 
Notation:  i = 1, …, N clusters (large) 
    t = 1, … , T time periods (small) 
Partitioning:  Partition the parameter vector 2 into 
θ '
θ1
θ2   where 21 (k×1) contains those parameters 
common to all clusters and 22 (N×1) contains the cluster-specific parameters (one per cluster, as in our 
first model, assumed for notational convenience). 
 
Non-Linear Least Squares: 
 
The Model:  yit = g(xit , $ , "i ) + git  
  
The minimization problem: 









The Gauss-Newton update: 
  Given a current “guess” 2
















 where the H simplifies the notation. 
  
eit / yit – g(xit, 2
*) 
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 again simplifying notation to S. 
 




























Using the partitioned inverse formulae (for a symmetric matrix) we have: 
 


















Now substituting and simplifying: 
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22  :H22 is an (N×N) matrix with zeroes off the diagonal.  The j
th diagonal term, which corresponds to 













for notational convenience.  Hence H
&1
22  is an (N × N) matrix with zeroes off the diagonal and diagonal 
elements (1/hi), i = 1, ... , N: 
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H12: H12 is a (k × N) matrix.  Each column corresponds to a different cluster.  The j
th column, 
corresponding to the j
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and is a (k × N) matrix with one column for each observation.  The j
th column mj/hj / ¯ mj,
 provides a 
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We see that the updating can proceed to two stages.  First, compute the update of the common parameters 
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